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Abstract.  In recent years the United States has turned to digital technologies to buoy its 
response to anti-Americanism in the so-called ‘Muslim world.’ At least three concepts 
appear to be shaping this effort. The first is a marketing-based strategy called 
‘engagement.’ The other two are derivations of Marshall McLuhan’s ‘global village’ and 
his aphorism that ‘the medium is the message.’ This paper focuses on the uses and 
misuses of McLuhan’s work by foreign policy officials in Washington. It argues that their 
stated purpose – to empower people and further inter-cultural understanding through 
dialogue – is dubious. Indeed, pronouncements regarding these potentials now sit 
uncomfortably alongside Washington’s use of these same technologies to manage dissent.  
By assessing digital engagement and a more general initiative called ‘internet freedom’ 
(both in the light of what McLuhan, in fact, says), American aspirations involving digital 
communications are shown to be more than just contradictory; they are dangerously 
misguided.  
 
 
What if the way we perceive a problem is part of the problem? What if the way we 
spontaneously formulate a problem mystifies the problem?  
          -- Slavoj Žižek1 
 
An enthusiasm for almost everything ‘digital’ has crept into the formulations of 
American foreign policy officials.2 Beyond post-Cold War allusions to the rising 
                                                 
The author thanks the anonymous reviewers for their helpful critiques as well as 
Hamilton Bean for his generous contributions. Thank you to James Compton for his input 
on an earlier draft. Special thanks are extended to Robert Babe for his insights and 
guidance, especially his help in the task of unraveling the complexities of McLuhan’s 
thought. 
1 Slavoj Žižek, Lecture at the London School of Economics, 3 July 2011, available online 
at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cW1zUh94uMY> 
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importance of “soft power,”3 a more recent interest in digitalized communications is 
being expressed through a Department of State initiative called ‘internet freedom.’ 
According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, “the world of MySpace is creating a global world of 
‘OurSpace,’ linking hundreds of millions of individuals across continents.”4 In a 
“networked world,” she writes, “the U.S. has the potential to be the most connected 
country ... [T]he U.S.’s exceptional capacity for connection ... will renew its power and 
restore its global purpose.”5  
A core concept informing such assertions is Marshall McLuhan’s prophesy, first 
articulated more than fifty years ago, that the world is becoming a global village. For 
McLuhan, this ‘village’ is the outcome of the speeding up of social relations through the 
use of electronic media and how this acceleration affects both the material and perceived 
integration of space. It is, he says, communicative speed that breaks down barriers 
between the local and the global, private and public, proximity and distance. Thus, for 
McLuhan, the global village constitutes an experiential reality – one that mimics a sense 
of universal immediacy.  
In this paper, I argue that a prima facie case can be made demonstrating 
McLuhan’s influence on contemporary thinking in relation to an ascendant global 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 An example of this borderline Utopianism is James Lull’s “The Open Spaces of Global 
Communication,” Revista Fronteiras – Estudos Midiáticos 11:2 (May-AugUst 2009), pp. 
148-58; for another that is more germane to students of foreign policy, see Clay Shirky, 
“The Political Power of Social Media,” Foreign Affairs 90:1 (January-February 2011), 
pp. 28-41.  
3 Joseph Nye and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs 
75:2 (March-April 1996), pp. 20-36.  
4 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America’s Edge, Power in the Networked Century,” Foreign 
Affairs 88:1 (January-February 2009), pp. 98.  
5 Ibid, p. 113. 
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village.6 Herein I assess the use and misuse of McLuhan’s work by the Obama 
administration and the United States Department of State in the context of two policy 
initiatives – digital engagement and ‘internet freedom.’ To do this I first contextualize 
both in terms of Washington’s response to anti-Americanism after 9/11 as it initially was 
expressed through efforts by the Bush administration to ‘re-brand’ America and, more 
recently, in terms of the Obama administration’s embrace of social media as a means of 
engaging foreign Muslims directly. This section constitutes a necessary (largely 
descriptive) overview of policy developments since 2001 and, as such, readers already 
familiar with this recent history may want to skip these pages. Second, I start relating 
what is addressed in the first section to McLuhan’s work, stressing the predominance of 
simplistic or inaccurate interpretations. And third, I use writings by and interviews with 
McLuhan to critique these policy applications, concluding that the misguided (or perhaps 
disingenuous) use of his work may yield contradictory (if not dark) outcomes.  
As implied by the questions posed by Slavoj Žižek quoted above, there appears to 
be an inability (or unwillingness) among foreign policy officials to recognize the 
complexities and ambiguities of the global village, the medium is the message, and some 
of McLuhan’s other key ideas. Indeed, perhaps Washington’s very understanding of the 
                                                 
6 This thinking or ‘reality’ constitutes a largely constructed, inter-subjective way of 
understanding the world. Although in this paper the space needed to specify how this has 
taken place is limited, there are several possible explanations as to why the global village 
concept (or metaphor) resonated in the context of perceived and experiential changes. For 
one thing, in the 1960s McLuhan’s writings became widely known (but not well 
understood) through his participation in innumerable mass media interviews, references 
to him on primetime television shows such as Laugh In, and by appearing as himself in 
the academy award winning film Annie Hall. For another, a renewed interest in his 
prognostications, especially among Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, emerged when he was 
named Wired Magazine’s “patron saint” in 1996. See Gary Wolf, “The Wisdom of Saint 
Marshall, the Holy Fool,” Wired Magazine Iss. 4.01 (January 1996), available online at 
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive//4.01/saint.marshal.html?topic=&topic_set> 
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nature of anti-American extremism itself is delusional – delusional in ways that 
McLuhan, I think, would not find surprising.7    
 
America’s Embrace of Digital Communications  
 
Over the past twenty years foreign policy analysts and officials in Washington generally 
have come to embrace digital communications. In the 1990s the Clinton administration 
promoted what it called a global information infrastructure – an integrated transnational 
system involving trade-based information flow guarantees and intellectual property rights 
promoted as means of realizing the competitive advantages of particular American firms 
(such as Microsoft) and, more generally, production process efficiencies for an array of 
corporations.8 After the attacks of September 11, 2001, such an infrastructure came to be 
regarded as essential for monitoring potential enemies (through surveillance), waging 
rapidly deployed multi-front military campaigns and, eventually, developing more 
sophisticated means of modifying anti-Americanism through new techniques using what 
the State Department calls public diplomacy and the Pentagon refers to as strategic 
communications.9  
Among the agencies involved in these activities, a new approach, inspired in part 
                                                 
7 Elsewhere, I address other aspects of delusional thinking in American foreign policy. 
See Edward A. Comor, Consumption and the Globalization Project (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), esp. ch. 6. Also see Edward Comor and Hamilton Bean, 
“America’s ‘Engagement’ Delusion: Critiquing a Public Diplomacy Consensus,” 
International Communication Gazette 74:3 (April 2012), pp. 203-220. 
8 Edward A. Comor, Communication, Commerce and Power (London: Macmillan, 1998). 
9 Public diplomacy is a term used to describe the efforts by state officials to win support 
and a favorable image among the publics of other countries whereas strategic 
communications refer to efforts, mostly by military and intelligence officials, to modify 
an opponent's opinions and actions in light of particular military or strategic interests.  
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at least by developments in marketing, has become dominant. For marketers, 
‘engagement’ involves the use digital technologies in the process of impelling potential 
customers to take part in producing elements of their own consumption (including their 
participation in developing brands). “Every consumer,” wrote management consultant 
Don Tapscott in 1996, “on the information highway becomes a producer by creating and 
sending a message to a colleague, contributing to a ... discussion group, ... test driving a 
virtual car.”10  
A turning point in conceptualizing the foreign policy applications of engagement 
came one month after 9/11 when advertising executive Charlotte Beers was asked to ‘re-
brand’ the United States. In 2002 Beers instituted what she called America’s “shared 
values” campaign. It sought to demonstrate to Muslims in other countries that they have 
the same values as Americans – values, it was emphasized, shared by all “civilized” 
peoples: a respect for democracy, liberty, and private property.11 Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, in explaining Beers’s appointment to Congress, argued that “[t]here is nothing 
wrong with getting somebody who knows how to sell something. We are selling a 
product. We need someone who can re-brand American foreign policy.”12  
Soon after the campaign began, however, according to the Pew Global Attitudes 
Project and other public opinion studies, it became clear that Beers had failed.13 Among 
                                                 
10 Don Tapscott, The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked 
Intelligence (New York: McGraw-Hill 1996), p. 63. 
11 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(Washington, DC: National Security Council, 2002), available online at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html> 
12 Quoted in Naomi Klein, “America is Not a Hamburger,” The Guardian, 14 March 
2002, available online at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2002/mar/14/marketingandpr.comment>  
13 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Pew Global Attitudes Project: 
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other problems, what “shared values” implied – a mutual set of beliefs on which to 
pursue some kind of inter-cultural dialogue – in practice involved a mostly one-way 
monologue about America’s tolerance. More problematic was the disconnect between the 
campaign’s assertions and continuing support for regimes that had little interest in human 
rights, civil liberties, or economic justice. Such miscalculations continued for most of the 
Bush years, improving only in the latter months of the President’s second term when the 
administration began to promote the use of digital technologies by ‘moderate’ voices in 
the Muslim world. This shift was an attempt to empower ‘tolerant’ people, enabling them 
to sidestep the ‘radical’ views being exchanged (it was assumed) in mosques, coffee 
shops, and on ‘the Muslim street.’14 According to the United States Government 
Accountability Office, over its two terms, the Bush administration spent $10 billion on 
public diplomacy but had little to show for it.15  
The Obama White House and Department of State under Hillary Clinton 
subsequently solicited the expertise of the largest internet and social media corporations 
in the United States, including Google and Facebook. By early-2010, digital engagement 
and a more general policy called ‘internet freedom’ had become pillars of President 
Obama’s foreign policy. This embrace of digital communications also was influenced by 
corporations who sought help from Washington to combat censorship and other costly 
interventions by foreign states. Arguably, President Clinton’s promotion of a global 
                                                                                                                                                 
Views of a Changing World,” June 2003, available online at <http://people-press.org/> 
14 James Glassman, “Winning the War of Ideas,” speech before the Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, 8 July 2008, available online at 
<http://newcentrist.wordpress.com/2008/07/23/james-k-glassman-winning-the-war-of-
ideas/> 
15 United States Government Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues 
for Congressional Oversight (Washington, DC: G.A.O., 2009), p. 2. 
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information infrastructure in the 1990s (and, before this, America’s post-1945 efforts to 
institutionalize, in international law, what was called ‘the free flow of information’) has 
come full circle with Hillary Clinton’s similarly corporate-influenced support for 
‘internet freedom.’ Here it is helpful to quote her at length on what kinds of freedom this 
entails: 
 
… we believe it’s critical that … Users [of the internet] are assured certain basic 
freedoms. Freedom of expression is first among them…  
 
The freedom of worship Usually involves the rights of individuals to commune or 
not commune with their Creator… The internet can help bridge divides between 
people of different faiths… And as we look for ways to expand dialogue, the 
internet holds out such tremendous promise… 
 
A connection to global information networks is like an on-ramp to modernity… 
Information networks have become a great leveler, and we should use them 
together to help lift people out of poverty and give them a freedom from want… 
 
The freedom to connect is like the freedom of assembly, only in cyberspace. It 
allows individuals to get online, come together, and hopefully cooperate...16 
 
                                                 
16 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” United States Department of State, 
21 January 2010, available online at 
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm> 
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As implied, this initiative constitutes a sweeping effort to forge the international 
norms needed to allow individuals ready access to the internet.17 “Internet freedom,” says 
Clinton, “supports the peace and security that provides a foundation for global 
progress.”18 
 ‘Internet freedom’ appears to flow directly out of engagement. After all, dialogue 
and the open exchange of information seem to go hand in hand while both are 
fundamentally important if people are to feel respected, listened to, and directly involved 
in at least some aspects of United States foreign policy.19 However, beyond the rhetoric, 
rather than promoting an endless multiplicity of conversations and hoping these will yield 
positive outcomes, ‘internet freedom’ is more concerned with defending the private 
property of Google, Facebook, and other United States-based companies.20 Moreover, its 
                                                 
17 Of course corporations whose businesses facilitate ‘internet freedom’ systemically and 
consciously restrict or frame such freedoms. To use a Habermasian example, their 
entrenched commercial priorities structurally limit the qualitative dimensions of the 
discourses that are enabled. A specific example of a corporation’s political orientations 
and interdependencies in relation to the American state is Apple’s rejection of an iPhone 
app that tracks United States drone strikes. According to Apple, the app was refused 
because “many people were likely to find the content objectionable.” UAV News, “Apple 
Shoots Down Drone Strike Tracking iPhone App,” SpaceWar.com, 30 August 2012, 
available online at 
<http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Apple_shoots_down_drone_strike_tracking_iPhone_
app_999.html>  
18 Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom” 
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm> 
19 Contradicting this push for free speech and openness are United States efforts to shut 
down perhaps the world’s best known online ‘whistle blowing’ organization – 
WikiLeaks. 
20 Although ‘internet freedom’ has been couched in ways that champion freedom of 
speech and civil liberties, its institutionalization coincided with China’s interference with 
Google’s private property in the form of state agencies hacking into Google computers in 
2009. Prior to this, at least four United States-based transnational corporations co-
operated with Chinese censorship requirements – Cisco, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google. 
See Jonathan Fenby, “Google blazes a trail with China rift,” The Guardian, 13 January 
2010, available online at 
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implied opening up of a dialogue with and among oppressed people worldwide is meant 
to be more strategic than free flowing; more a foreign policy calculation than an open-
ended exploration.21 According to foreign policy analysts Kristin Lord and Mark Lynch, 
engagement itself entails  
 
… a planned process, based on a carefully researched understanding of the 
audience and of its interests, couched in language calibrated to engage the 
audience in the intended manner, using the best one- or two-way method of 
engagement … as part of a larger strategy, and evaluated to determine if it is 
successful in advancing ... intended goals” [emphases added].22 
 
 The official who introduced digital engagement was Bush’s last Undersecretary of 
State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, James Glassman. “The U.S. need not be 
Miss Congeniality to win the war of ideas,” said Glassman; “We just need to make 
moderates hate extremists more than they dislike us.”23 With this in mind, Glassman 
recognized the internet to be an under-utilized means of interacting with audiences, 
                                                                                                                                                 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/jan/13/google-china-
politics-censorship?INTCMP=SRCH>  
21 Comor and Bean, “America’s ‘Engagement’ Delusion,” p. 204. 
22 Kristin Lord, and Mark Lynch, America’s Extended Hand: Assessing the Obama 
Administration’s Global Engagement Policy (Washington, DC: Center for a New 
American Security, 2010), p. 11. As Obama’s first Undersecretary of State for Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith McHale, told Congress, “We must create an 
institutional framework that can take full advantage of new media, with an understanding 
that these new tools must be carefully tailored to particular circumstances and always 
used in the service of a larger strategy.” Judith McHale, “Testimony at Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Confirmation Hearing,” 13 May 2009, available online at 
<http://www.state.gov/r/remarks/124155.htm> 
23 James Glassman, “It’s not about Us,” Foreign Policy, 1 September 2009, available 
online at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/01/its_not_about_Us.> 
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linking selected organizations from around the world in order to support those elements 
of civil society that have ‘moderate’ political agendas.  
 The State Department launched its primary public diplomacy website, called 
America.gov, in January 2008. In early-2011, however, it was shut down and State 
Department efforts to reach foreign publics have since been decentralized to United 
States embassies, consulates, and missions which now sponsor over four hundred social 
media sites using Facebook and Twitter.24 Beginning in 2009, the Department launched 
its X-Life cell phone games (whose slogan is “bridging cultures one pixel at a time”) that, 
according to their creators, allow users to “experience the dynamism and vitality of 
American life” by “projecting the fundamental values that Americans cherish: tolerance, 
freedom, and respect for cultural and religious differences.”25 Also active is the 
Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs. It hosts training “webinars” 
on social media best practices.26 
 These and other efforts to promote digital engagement entail two significant 
themes. First, they signal a paring back of earlier goals – moving foreign 
communications policy away from converting almost everyone harboring anti-American 
                                                 
24 As of the end of 2011, the State Department says it has thirteen million followers on 
Facebook and another two million on Twitter. Lizzy Tomei, “Anti-US protests and the 
challenges of ‘21st century statecraft’,” Global Post, 25 September 2012, available online 
at < http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/united-
states/120921/anti-us-protests-test-21st-century-statecraft> 
 
25 Helle Dale, “Public Diplomacy 2.0: Where the United States Government Meets ‘New 
Media’,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2346, 8 December 2009, available online 
at <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/public-diplomacy-2-0-where-the-
US-government-meets-new-media> 
26 Alicia M. Cohn, “State Department shifts digital resources to social media,” 
The Hill, 27 December 2011, available online at <http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-
valley/technology/157501-state-dept-shifts-digital-resources-to-social-
media?page=2#comments> 
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views toward, instead, a more targeted (marketing) effort. Rather than communicating to 
a mass audience, Glassman’s brief tenure sparked a shift to engaging those already 
inclined to reject anti-American violence; at least those who have access to digital media 
(especially the young and literate). Successful marketing strategies almost always direct 
their communications at a limited number of prospective customers, particularly those 
with whom one’s message likely will resonate. Glassman – himself a former business 
journalist – also espoused a technique called “diversion” – “the channeling of potential 
recruits away from violence with the attractions of entertainment, culture, … [and] 
sports...”27 (Glassman 2008).  
A second theme involves the promotion of what Hillary Clinton calls ‘Civil 
Society 2.0’ – a virtual civil society that reflects and constructs a functioning public 
sphere within and among Muslim communities. In addition to being a vague analogy to 
discourses concerning an (interactive) ‘Web 2.0’, Clinton also (and, again, vaguely) 
implies that, above all else, that the ‘Muslim world’ yearns to develop ‘moderate’ 
associations and communities, that digital technologies can be used to respond to this 
yearning, and that such communicative capacities will enable people to transcend the 
persistent political-cultural influence of anti-Western extremism.28  
 
Engagement, ‘Truth’ and McLuhan’s Medium Theory  
                                                 
27 James Glassman, “Winning the War of Ideas,” The Sun, 23 July 2008, accessed at 
<http://www.nysun.com/opinion/winning-the-war-of-ideas/82438/> 
28 Readers interested in pursuing a critique of such policies may be interested in Evgeny 
Morozov’s The Net Delusion (New York : Public Affairs, 2011). For a thoughtful 
analysis of the internet’s role in the development of a transnational public sphere, see 
Elisabeth Chaves, “The Internet as Global Platform? Grounding the Magically Levitating 
Public Sphere,” New Political Science, 32:1 (March 2010), pp. 23-41.  
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McLuhan’s nuanced definition of the global village, presented at the outset, has not been 
used by either the Bush or Obama administrations (at least not publicly). For them, the 
global village instead constitutes a straightforward metaphor – describing a world 
characterized by the ubiquity of instantaneous electronic communications. This village is 
more a fact than an ambiguous or contradictory process, and it is in this one-dimensional 
context that officials have situated their policy initiatives. Before we critique this position 
in light of McLuhan’s own work, let us more directly link engagement and ‘internet 
freedom’ to official Washington’s understanding of the global village.  
          Glassman’s successor, Judith McHale – the former Chief Executive Officer of the 
Discovery Channel – emphasized two tasks. The first was what she referred to as “a 
critical component of … effective mass communication” – “market research.”29 The 
second involves the need to apply digital communications in ways that “engage people 
directly.”30 Just as social media platforms have been developed in response to the needs 
of marketers and advertisers,31 such technological applications can be, according to 
McHale, “a game changer … [as they provide] the opportunity to move from an old 
paradigm, in which our government speaks as one to many, to a new model of engaging 
                                                 
29 Quoted in Ed Feulner, “The battle for public opinion,” The Gaffney Ledger, 31 
December 2009, available online at <http://www.gaffneyledger.com/news/2009-12-
31/Columns/GUEST_COLUMNIST.html>  
30 Judith McHale, “Testimony at Senate Foreign Relations Committee Confirmation 
Hearing,” 13 May 2009, available online at 
<http://www.state.gov/r/remarks/124155.htm> 
31 Detlev Zwick, Samuel Bonsu and Aaron Darmodt, “Putting Consumers to Work,” 
Journal of Consumer Culture 8:2 (July 2008), pp. 163-196; Vincent Manzerolle, 
“Mobilizing the Audience Commodity,” Ephemera, 10:3/4 (2010), pp. 455-69. 
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interactively and collaboratively across lines that might otherwise divide...”32 
 To repeat, the antecedent of this ‘game changing’ strategy stemmed from a 
different set of problems – problems faced by private sector interests. Among these was a 
growing cynicism among consumers who had become increasingly distrustful of 
commercial promotions and their (often dubious) promises. Another was the outcome of 
an ever more cluttered promotional environment, making it more difficult for marketers 
and advertisers to reach targeted audiences. A third hurdle (one more directly facing 
public relations firms) involved a paradox: in an emerging information-rich society, the 
circulation, mostly through the internet, of harmful facts, costly rumors and, occasionally, 
outright fabrications had become almost commonplace.33 A prospective solution to these 
problems was to apply digital technologies in ways that would engage people directly – 
engaging them through inter-active, participatory, and ego-enhancing activities crafted to 
encourage positive associations with products and brands.34  
 This use of technology resonated with post-9/11 concerns about legitimizing 
American policies overseas. To quote one of the State Department’s consultants, 
Facebook executive Elliot Schrage, 
 
… the question is how do you build an audience? How do you establish a 
community of interests? That’s as true for the maker of laundry detergent as it is 
for someone who has a stimulus package for economic growth. … [I]t’s about 
                                                 
32 McHale, “Testimony at Senate Foreign Relations Committee” 
<http://www.state.gov/r/remarks/124155.htm> 
33 Carl H. Botan and Maureen Taylor, “Public Relations: State of the Field,” Journal of 
Communication, 54:4 (December 2004), pp. 645-661. 
34 Zwick et al., “Putting Consumers to Work,” pp. 168-71. 
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communicating a message, finding a community, and building that community, 
engaging that community. So, do I see Facebook as being an incredibly valuable 
tool for public diplomacy? Absolutely.35   
  
“21st-century statecraft,” reports The New York Times, “is not mere corporate re-
branding – swapping tweets for broadcasts. It [constitutes] ... a way to amplify traditional 
diplomatic efforts, develop tech-based policy solutions and encourage cyberactivism.”36 
Applications include following Barack Obama on Twitter, participating in a virtual town 
hall meeting with Hillary Clinton, or debating a particular policy in a chat room hosted by 
the State Department. Another example is the annual “Democracy Challenge” video 
competition. Visitors to www.videochallenge.america.gov are asked to create a short 
video that completes the phrase “Democracy is…’’ Winners receive a trip to Washington, 
New York, and Hollywood “to attend gala screenings” of their videos that, it promises, 
will give successful contestants “exposure to the U.S. film and television industry and 
[the opportunity to] meet with creative talent, democracy advocates and government 
leaders.”  
There are also covert applications for digital engagement. For example, the 
Obama administration has been constructing a “shadow internet” engineered to enable 
dissidents in selected countries to circumvent state monitoring and censorship, 
particularly through the use of cell phone networks that only American officials can 
                                                 
35 Elliot Schrage, Interview, CFR.org, 11 May 2009, available online at  
<www.cfr.org/publication/19300/new_media_tools_and_public_diplomacy.html> 
36 Jesse Lichtenstein, “Digital Diplomacy,” The New York Times, 16 July 2010, available 
online at  <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/magazine/18web2-0-
t.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3&ref=state_department> 
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activate.37 Another involves the utilization of Facebook, Twitter, and other sites using 
fake online identities – applying what is called “sock puppet” software – to influence 
seemingly frank and open deliberations in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, and Pashto. Virtual 
private servers located in other counties are used to further the impression that the false 
personas are genuine.38 More generally, by encouraging people to network with ‘friends’ 
through monitored websites, precise data also can be generated on the views and 
associations of participants. 
Just as marketers are not engaging audiences primarily to act on their preferences, 
the use of digital engagement by American officials is not about conversing with others 
before constructing policies (the hesitant and inconsistent responses by the United States 
to popular uprisings in the Middle East underlines this point). Having said this, however, 
even if we take Obama administration claims about its efforts to promote a digital 
dialogue at face value, these entail a number of dubious assumptions. One is the notion 
that a relatively open exchange of information will lead to inter-cultural understanding; at 
least the kind of understanding that will complement United States interests. In the words 
of Judith McHale, “a key part of what we're trying to do, [is] to really have people engage 
with each other, to learn about each other.”39 However, as former United States 
                                                 
37 James Glanz and John Markoff, “US Underwrites Internet Detour Around Censors,” 
The New York Times, 12 June 2011, available online at  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/12/world/12internet.html?_r=4&pagewanted=1> 
38 Nick Fielding and Ian Cobain, “Revealed: U.S. spy operation that manipulates social 
media” The Guardian, 17 March 2011, available online at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/17/Us-spy-operation-social-
networks?INTCMP=SRCH> 
39 Quoted in Alice Johnson, “Public diplomacy critical in information age, Interview with 
Judith McHale,” gulfnews.com, 11 November 2011, available online at 
<http://gulfnews.com/news/world/Usa/public-diplomacy-critical-in-information-age-
1.710512> 
 16 
Information Agency official Bruce Gregory points out, “Shared understandings may not 
overcome deep disagreement on interests and issues. Exchanges [and more contemporary 
modes of engagement] may reinforce hostilities and competing values, particularly if 
others experience an America that is myopic, hubristic, and uninformed about the 
world.”40 
Secretary Clinton, of course, recognizes the many deleterious implications of 
some digital technology applications such as those used by organized crime or, from her 
perspective, the security threats stemming from the activities of WikiLeaks. The 
hypocrisy of this view becomes apparent, however, in light of the debatable legality of 
the American state’s parallel use of the internet to strengthen its surveillance and ‘cyber-
war’ capabilities. Indeed, while digital engagement aims to leverage social media and 
other internet-mediated communications in ways that impel audiences to persuade 
themselves to reject anti-Western extremism, ultimately Washington’s embrace of 
engagement is misplaced and contradictory – misplaced and contradictory because the 
political-cultural capacities that officials seek to develop (in accordance with a surface-
level reading of McLuhan) are (when a more precise reading is applied) more likely to 
yield opposite results.  
Glassman, testifying to Congress in March 2010, stressed the futility of preaching 
or “telling the world how wonderful we are.” A more effective means of communicating, 
he explained, “is through the generation of a wide and deep conversation. Our role in that 
conversation is as facilitator and convener.” He went on to stress that  
                                                 
40 Bruce Gregory, “Public diplomacy and strategic communication,” Paper presented at 
the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication 
and Conflict, 31 AugUst 2005, pp. 10-11, available online at  
<www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/gregory.pdf> 
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… the method of communication is itself a reflection of American values 
[emphases in original]. The medium, as Marshall McLuhan said, is the message. 
We, as Americans, do not dictate. Rather, we believe that, in a free and open 
discussion, the best ideas will prevail, and we want to encourage the free 
expression of views… [O]ur mission then … is to use the tools of ideological 
engagement – words, deeds, and images – to create an environment hostile to 
violent extremism [latter emphasis added].41  
 
What various modes of digital engagement share is an emphasis on audience 
participation; people actively taking part in constructing their own truths but in contexts 
or environments crafted to promote particular kinds of truth. This emphasis on 
experiential involvement and relationships echoes what has been called a medium theory 
approach generally and McLuhan’s version of it more specifically. “At the heart of 
medium theory,” explains Ronald Deibert, “is the argument that changes in the mode of 
communication … have an important effect on the trajectory of social evolution… 
Medium theory traces these effects to the properties of the medium itself regardless of the 
content or the message being transmitted.”42 In other words, how human beings relate to 
one another and how we do things – constituting the contexts of how we think and act – 
are just as important (if not more important) than what we say (that is, the articulated 
                                                 
41 James Glassman, “Strategic Public Diplomacy,” Testimony Before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy, 10 
March 2010, available online at 
<http://mountainrunner.Us/2010/03/jim_glassmans_testimony_before/>  
42 Ronald Deibert, Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia (New York: Columbia 
University Press), p. 6. 
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content of our communications). “It is the medium,” writes McLuhan, “that shapes and 
controls the scale and form of human association and action.”43  
 There were two foundational theorists of medium theory – the early twentieth 
century political economist Harold Innis and, after his death in 1952, McLuhan. For both, 
media – broadly defined to include a range of technologies, organizations and institutions 
– are assessed as the environments through which people engage in all kinds of cultural, 
political, and economic interactions. How these environments are structured facilitate 
some ways of thinking and acting over others. It is McLuhan’s version of medium theory 
that has become the better known of the two. In fact, much of what now constitutes 
‘common sense’ for many American proponents of digital communications tends to 
parrot a generally optimistic interpretation of McLuhan’s work. For example, in 
interviews and statements, Obama appointee Judith McHale reiterates Bush appointee 
Glassman’s ‘medium is the message’ approach to public diplomacy claiming, repeatedly, 
that the United States wants to “create an environment in which people can debate...”44 
Sarah Labowitz, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor, similarly argues that America’s ‘internet freedom’ agenda rests on one core 
premise: the internet should be “an open public space” – a space to be protected and 
promoted rather than used as a tool for specific objectives.45 This approach, particularly 
                                                 
43 Marshall McLuhan, Essential McLuhan (Concord: House of Anansi, 1995), p. 152. 
44 Emphasis in original. McHale, “US Undersecretary Of State for Public Diplomacy 
talks about America’s image,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 30 November 2010, 
available online at  
<http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Under_Secretary_Of_State_For_Public_Diplomacy_T
alk_About_Americas_Image/2217717.html.> 
45 Quoted in Roy Revie, “The Tangled Web of ‘Internet Freedom,’” World Policy Blog, 
11 July 2012, available online at < http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2012/07/11/tangled-
web-internet-freedom> 
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in light of McLuhan’s original work (elaborated below), reveals a naive or disingenuous 
view that the internet constitutes a neutral mediator of inherently progressive and 
cooperative human relations.46  
Arguably, McLuhan’s status as an (in)famous 1960s public intellectual and, 
paradoxically, the ambiguities that surround his writings help to explain such imprecise 
interpretations. Although it seems unlikely that many officials have read McLuhan 
directly, his work resonates in part because his analysis of electronic communications 
appears to be more relevant today than it was fifty years ago. The first speech on ‘internet 
freedom,’ delivered by Secretary Clinton in January 2010, for instance, is full of allusions 
to McLuhan. When she states that “[t]he spread of information networks is forming a 
new nervous system for our planet” one is reminded of McLuhan’s claim that electronic 
communication constitutes “the extension of our central nervous system.”47  
 
McLuhan’s Sensorium, His Global Village, and United States Foreign Policy 
 
                                                 
46 As Roy Revie puts it, divorcing ‘internet freedom’ from its strategic mandate is “akin 
to asserting the freedom of outer space while simultaneously developing programs to 
militarize or otherwise strategically exploit it.” Ibid. 
47 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 110. Direct or indirect references to McLuhan can be found in 
various United States public diplomacy texts. One of the earliest appears in an article 
published in 1970 by senior American diplomat Alan Carter. In it, Carter references 
McLuhan when he conceptualizes foreign audiences in an affecting “environmental 
shell” involving a “combination” of media, inter-personal, and inter-organizational 
communications. Carter, in sum, conveys a McLuhanesque understanding of media 
environments and their influence. Alan Carter, “The State of the Art: Communications 
and Foreign Affairs,” Foreign Service Journal, 47:8 (August 1970), pp. 31-2 & 46-7. 
Thanks to Bruce Gregory for bringing this piece to my attention. 
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For McLuhan the history of media (broadly defined) is a history of human beings 
extending themselves physically and mentally. Mechanical innovations, he says, 
empower humanity’s control over space (through, for example, railways) and time (for 
example, the mechanical clock) yet, in so doing, our sense of community and balance is 
fractured. As media extend what we do they modify how we think. This is less an 
intellectual process than it is sensual. For him, media modify people by reshaping their 
perceptive capacities. What he referred to as the golden age of manuscript culture, for 
instance, was characterized by a state of (relative) balance among our senses. This, for 
McLuhan, was a time and place (in parts of medieval Europe) where inter-personal 
dialogue and independent abstract thinking through literacy co-existed, at least for a 
small minority. The result was a mediating environment in which a deep sense of 
understanding was accommodated through orality while logical reasoning also was 
facilitated through writing. However, with the emergence of the printing press (whose 
products flourished through the dynamic of capitalism), this balance was disrupted.  
 McLuhan proposed the sensorium to denote the interaction of our senses.48 At any 
given place and time, it is characterized by a ratio among them. The eye (or sight) 
perceives space in mostly linear, connected, and serial ways; visual space tends to be 
continuous and controllable, impelling people to think about things (including other 
people and nature) as manageable objects detached from the viewer. This capacity to 
distance oneself – to objectify and manage – is, of course, essential for scientific and 
rational thinking. In McLuhan’s mind, the most important contribution made by the 
printing press was not its use in promoting literacy and the sharing of information. 
                                                 
48 Robert E. Babe, Media, Structures, and Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2011), p. 257. 
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Instead, the importance of print lay in its impact on the sensorium. Together, printing and 
the alphabet constituted the environment through which individualization, specialization, 
and rationalism became cultural norms in Europe.  
The ear by contrast is attuned to (or accommodates) an acoustic space – a space 
that is hard to control and objectify. In addition to its relatively unmanageable and 
continuous characteristics, the auditory tends to be simultaneous and everywhere; it is 
both outside and inside our heads and, as such, it undermines the use of sight to order 
things. “We shape our tools,” said McLuhan, “and thereafter our tools shape us.”49  
According to Robert Babe, McLuhan’s approach “stems in large part from his 
analysis of perception and his concern for effects. Media … may extend or amplify one 
or other of the senses, increasing thereby the relative importance of that perceptor in the 
sensorium.”50 Furthermore, such sensory extensions interact bi-directionally with media 
environments. The media we create, once in use, influence us, impelling people to favor 
some extensions and senses over others. Usually these effects are not perceived precisely 
because they are integral in shaping how people think. On this point, McLuhan references 
the Greek myth of Narcissus to emphasize that humanity tends to be mesmerized by its 
own capabilities. We are, he says, generally unable to recognize our extensions and, thus, 
our sensory orientations. In his interview in Playboy magazine, McLuhan explained this 
observation as follows: 
 
It's a process rather like that which occurs to the body under shock or stress 
conditions, or to the mind in line with the Freudian concept of repression. I call 
                                                 
49 McLuhan, Understanding Media, p. xi. 
50 Babe, Media, Structures, and Power, p. 259. 
 22 
this peculiar form of self-hypnosis Narcissus narcosis, a syndrome whereby man 
remains unaware of the psychic and social effects of his new technology. ... As a 
result, precisely at the point where a new media-induced environment becomes all 
pervasive and transmogrifies our sensory balance, it also becomes invisible.51  
 
Given how fundamental the sensorium is in McLuhan’s work, it is doubtful, 
despite his sometimes outlandish and contradictory statements, that he believed humanity 
could build a truly harmonious transnational society, at least not one preceded by the 
peaceful evolution of inter-cultural understanding. While it is true that McLuhan 
anticipates the eventual formulation of a “cosmic consciousness” (as discussed below), 
this almost metaphysical state arguably can only emerge after the reactionary and violent 
global village runs its course. Having said this, such prognostications were meant to 
provoke more than inform. For the most part, rather than presenting some kind of 
analytical roadmap, McLuhan insisted that such assertions – which he called “probes” – 
constitute intellectual challenges crafted to compel his contemporaries to awaken from 
their Narcissistic tendencies. 
With the telegraph, McLuhan said that human relations were liberated from 
mechanized forms of organization involving the dominance of the eye. For example, a 
multiplicity of times emerged within various spatial configurations as new electronic 
extensions facilitated the resurgence of listening and the ear. To illustrate this, McLuhan 
used the example of modern travel. What he refers to as the “railway medium” 
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available online at <http://www.nextnature.net/2009/12/the-playboy-interview-marshall-
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accelerated and expanded human capacities, enabling large cities, new economic patterns, 
and unprecedented social formations – transformations of space and time seemingly 
“independent of the freight or content” being carried.52 Rail travel also, he said, 
accommodated sociality and dialogue among passengers. The airplane further opened up 
non-linear space-time capabilities. When sitting on an airplane, McLuhan argued, people 
are “suspended in a kind of time zone” in which spatial references – such as where you 
are in relation to other places and times – are more open to various interpretations.53  
Air travel anticipated still more complex space-time dynamics in the electrical 
age. The implications of new media – from the telegraph to the telephone, from radio to 
television, and now, decades after McLuhan’s death, the internet – go well beyond the 
impact of the information transmitted. The electric galaxy, he proclaimed, mediates new 
freedoms of movement, association, and thought. Relatively ordered interactions will be 
eclipsed by multifaceted relationships and realities. Spaces and times in this global 
village will become ever more heterogeneous and overlapping. 
For McLuhan, however, the media themselves are “constitutive of both the idiom 
and the character of citizenship and debate.”54 The medium is the message, and media – 
the institutions, organizations and technologies we construct and use – have implications 
as environments. These environments are affecting, particularly in relation to humanity’s 
sense of space and time, and, to repeat, their influence is profound largely because we are 
unaware of these effects. Most analysts of media focus on content and use. McLuhan, 
                                                 
52 McLuhan, Understanding Media, p. 8. 
53 Quoted in Janine Marchessault, Marshall McLuhan: Cosmic Media. London: Sage, 
2005), p. 206. 
54 Marchessault, Ibid, p. 212. 
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however, warns that such foci are like “the juicy piece of meat that the burglar carries to 
distract the watchdog of the mind.”55  
To quote Elliot Schrage once more, Facebook and other such platforms 
interconnect people in ways that imply “a whole new level of accountability.” Just as his 
company “creates a real premium on authenticity,”56 online participatory relationships 
mediate, it is assumed, new or modified truths – truths that are relatively powerful 
precisely because they are communicated through a dialogue with trusted associates 
(often involving images that reaffirm the axiom ‘seeing is believing’). But what of 
McLuhan’s more abstract assertion – that content and information exchange are 
secondary to the impact of the media environment on the sensorium?  
 
Electricity points the way to an extension of the process of consciousness itself, 
on a world scale, and without any verbalization… The computer, in short, 
promises by technology a … universal understanding and unity. … The condition 
of ‘weightlessness,’ that biologists say promises a physical immortality, may be 
paralleled by the condition of speechlessness that could confer a perpetuity of 
collective harmony and peace.57  
 
This and similar statements may appear to be wholly optimistic. A more careful 
reading, however, reveals a more ambiguous – if not dystopian – vision. In fact, the more 
one delves into McLuhan the clearer it becomes that the global village is not an ideal 
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place to live. For one thing, it is a world of accelerating discontinuities inducing what 
McLuhan called “the Age of Anxiety.”58 Electric technologies, he says, reassert aspects 
of pre-modern acoustic culture. Like these pre-literate (and pre-individualistic) societies, 
the interdependencies of humanity will become increasingly apparent.59 Nevertheless, the 
causal relationships and sense of individual responsibility that were norms during the 
industrial age – through the dominance of the eye – will become elusive.60  
With digital technologies and, with them, an increasing volume of information 
being disseminated in ways seemingly divorced from cost, the pre-modern ability to 
listen with care is eclipsed. This, primarily, is the outcome of mounting time pressures 
and, of course, information overload. In this environment, neither the balancing of the 
senses idealized by McLuhan (for example, the medieval person’s use of both eye and ear 
to intimately inter-connect and objectively reason), nor relatively modern strategies for 
making sense of things (isolating a problem, studying it in detail, and coming up with 
logically coherent solutions) are probable. In the electric age, to make timely decisions, 
McLuhan recognizes that people are required to make sense of the world by reacting 
rather than analyzing as “action and reaction [now] occur [virtually] at the same time.”61  
When media are understood to be ‘the message’ rather than merely the conveyors 
of messages, the public sphere ideal – as implied in Clinton’s references to a ‘Civil 
Society 2.0’ – is rendered infeasible. Unlike the world envisioned in the Obama 
                                                 
58 McLuhan, Essential McLuhan, p. 150. 
59 Marshall McLuhan, Gutenberg Galaxy, The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: 
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administration’s calls for ‘internet freedom,’ in McLuhan’s global village people relate 
and act more through emotion, intuition, and a reactionary mindset rather than discussion, 
deliberation, and reflection.  
 
McLuhan’s Dark Vision 
 
McLuhan sometimes described the global village as more machine than community. This 
is because of its impersonal scale, ever-accelerating norms and, increasingly, the absence 
of reflexive human agency. More directly, and antithetical to what Hillary Clinton 
implies when she refers to “information networks” as “a new nervous system for our 
planet,” McLuhan views this emerging transnational society to be a profoundly alienating 
place, paradoxically because of humanity’s extensions.62 To reiterate, not only do our 
media creations extend us, they change us. Often, says McLuhan, the price we pay to 
amplify is the numbing of relevant senses. The automobile, for example, dramatically 
extends our spatial reach but we pay a price in that our intimate connection with the land 
is eradicated (a connection we possessed when we only walked). The mechanical clock 
frees us from the natural flow of time but also it severs us from the earth’s ecological 
rhythms. Ultimately, he says, the reach or power enabled by our extensions entails a cost.   
 
                                                 
62 More paradoxically still (and in keeping with his dialectical but sometimes self-
contradictory thinking), McLuhan postulated that this alienation and mechanization of 
social relations contain the seeds for a relatively harmonious (but mechanistic) future. 
“The computer,” he says, “holds out the promise of a technologically engendered state of 
universal understanding and unity, a state of absorption in [a] ... collective harmony and 
peace. ... By such orchestrated interplay of all media, whole cultures could now be 
programmed in order to improve and stabilize their emotional climate.” McLuhan, 
“Playboy Interview.” 
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The aloof and dissociated role of the literate man of the Western world is 
succumbing to the new, intense depth participation engendered by the electronic 
media and bringing us back in touch with ourselves as well as with one another. 
But the instant nature of electric-information movement is decentralizing – rather 
than enlarging – the family of man into a new state of multitudinous tribal 
existences. Particularly in countries where literate values are deeply 
institutionalized, this is a highly traumatic process, since the clash of the old 
segmented visual culture and the new integral electronic culture creates a crisis of 
identity, a vacuum of the self, which generates tremendous violence.63  
 
Thus, when McLuhan refers to a “process of consciousness” without 
“verbalization” (and one in which “speechlessness” becomes essential to humanity’s 
“harmony”), he is not anticipating a world in which truths are formulated in thoughtful or 
reflexive ways. Instead, people are interlinked inside an electronic membrane that 
compels an accelerating universalization of shared immediacies.64  
Whether United States officials view digital technologies as tools or mediating 
spaces, there is little opposition to the assertion that ‘internet freedom’ is “a major foreign 
policy priority”65 despite McLuhan’s view that the planet is becoming interlinked more 
through sensations than thoughtful connections (in fact, McLuhan originally called the 
global village a global theater). Because these sensations are multi-planed and anxiety-
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ridden, more than just cultures remain divided – individuals will “create their own 
spaces.”66 For McLuhan, the sensual implications of electronic forms of engagement 
generate an altogether contradictory outcome: disengagement.  
McLuhan likely would have assessed both digital engagement and ‘internet 
freedom’ as components of a more general media ecology that itself (at least during the 
transition from the removed-and-rational to the interconnected-and-sensual) undermines 
understanding. Through speed, information overload, and intellectual fragmentation, the 
capacity to converse and reflect are subjected to a traumatic transformation – a 
transformation from institutions that reflect visual and literate industrial society (one pole 
of McLuhan’s visual-auditory dialectic) to a global culture characterized by moment-to-
moment sensory intimacies. McLuhan, however, is not entirely pessimistic. As he told 
Playboy, “We live in a transitional era of profound pain and tragic identity quest, but the 
agony of our age is the labor pain of rebirth.”67  
To comprehend these seemingly inconsistent prognostications arguably 
McLuhan’s Catholic faith emboldened him to predict that through the maelstrom of 
change and destruction the human race could be re-born and the world re-formed. Thus at 
least some of the simplifications and contradictions found in McLuhan’s work make 
sense, at least in his own mind. “Psychic communal integration” he proclaimed, becomes 
“possible at last by the electronic media... In a Christian sense, this is merely a new 
interpretation of the mystical body of Christ; and Christ, after all, is the ultimate 
extension of man.”68 
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Faith (or mysticism) aside, medium theory itself illuminates our understanding of 
why American officials find it so difficult to recognize the contradictory nature of their 
policy responses to anti-Americanism. Following McLuhan, the marketing ontology now 
informing public diplomacy itself constitutes an affecting medium – one that normalizes 
the notion that anti-American extremism is a problem best managed through the lens of 
measurable indices and opinions rather than historically-generated power asymmetries 
and sensual-intellectual capacities.69  
The questions posed by Žižek at the beginning of this paper have still further 
resonance in the context of McLuhan’s sensorium. The irony of Washington foreign 
policy officials utilizing aurally-biased technologies to achieve visually-oriented ‘realist’ 
goals surely would not have escaped him.70 We thus might well consider it to be absurd 
                                                                                                                                                 
November 1971, available online at  
<http://www.catholictv.com/shows/default.aspx?seriesID=113&videoID=85>  
In this interview, McLuhan explains that electronic communications are similar to “the 
mystical body of Christ” in that both are pervasive and invisible, both resonate deeply by 
hearing “The Word,” and both eradicate the center and margins of human relations. In 
recognizing this possibility we can better comprehend McLuhan when he says “the global 
village makes maximum disagreement and creative dialogue inevitable. Uniformity and 
tranquility are not hallmarks of the global village; far more likely are conflict and discord 
as well as love and harmony” [emphases added]. McLuhan, “Playboy Interview.” 
69 To again demonstrate this disconnect, a report commissioned by the Pentagon 
recommends that United States officials draw on brand management strategies, stressing 
that Muslim populations can be treated as prospective customers. “We Will Help You,” 
its authors argue, would be an “elegant” slogan for American foreign policy as “[i]t 
serves as a message of inspiration for indigenous audiences, one that encompasses – and 
thus would not conflict with – a wide variety of potential end states.” Todd C. Helmus, 
Christopher Paul, and Russel W. Glenn, Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing 
Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation (RAND National 
Defence Research Institute, Santa Monica: 2007), p. 77. 
70United States ‘realist’ (or, more accurately, ‘neo-realist’) decision-making norms 
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containment of other (rival or oppositional) states. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand 
Chessboard (New York: Basic Books, 1997). 
 30 
that a linear, rationally calculated foreign policy now is embracing the very tools that 
McLuhan believed would mediate a global village dominated by reactionary 
irrationalities. Despite the “new extensions of man and the environment they generate, ... 
we still cannot free ourselves of the delusion that it is how a medium is used that counts, 
rather than what it does to us and with us. This,” McLuhan argued, “is the zombie stance 
of the technological idiot.”71 
 
Conclusion 
 
Now, ultimately, this issue isn’t just about information freedom; it is about what 
kind of world we want and what kind of world we will inhabit. It’s about whether 
we live on a planet with one internet, one global community, and a common body 
of knowledge that benefits and unites us all, or a fragmented planet in which 
access to information and opportunity is dependent on where you live and the 
whims of censors.72 
 
This excerpt from Secretary Clinton’s first ‘internet freedom’ speech raises a number of 
concerns. For careful readers of McLuhan, references to the emergence of “a common 
body of knowledge that benefits and unites” are difficult to comprehend.73  
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If, as many State Department officials argue, digital technologies can empower 
citizens, surely our review of McLuhan compels us to seek more specificity. For one 
thing, what kind of empowerment is this – the power to receive and disseminate 
information any place, any time, or is it the power to probe, discuss, and reflect through 
intellectually engaged forms of decision-making? Of course another question triggered by 
Washington’s enthusiasm for its own ‘21st Century Statecraft’ involves ‘realist’ concerns 
about this empowerment and its implied implosion of international power; shifting power 
away from state regimes into the hands of citizens. If the populations of Egypt, Libya, 
Syria (or, one day, Saudi Arabia) truly are transformed into autonomous, reflexive 
citizens, how might they act on these sovereign capabilities? Answering such questions 
has not been a priority for American officials probably because implicit and explicit 
references to McLuhan’s concepts have been under-theorized (or perhaps disingenuously 
applied). 
If there is even a kernel of plausibility in McLuhan’s dark vision, we should ask 
what stabilizing, consensus-building mechanisms feasibly can counter-balance a global 
civil society in which a nervous system-integrated (yet alienated) world faces two 
dystopian futures: one in which governance becomes little more than a state of perpetual 
action-and-reaction or one in which the extensions that link us together are, in effect, 
amputated? The former raises problems concerning continuity and stability while the 
latter suggests a future dominated by various forms of chauvinism and extremism.  
                                                                                                                                                 
by the electric media could conceivably usher in the millennium, but it also holds the 
potential for realizing the Anti-Christ... Cataclysmic environmental changes such as these 
are, in and of themselves, morally neutral; it is how we perceive them and react to them 
that will determine their ultimate psychic and social consequences. If we refuse to see 
them at all, we will become their servants [emphases added]. McLuhan, “Playboy 
Interview.” 
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Despite the ambiguities and leaps of logic that pervade McLuhan’s writings, by 
probing the complexities of his foundational concepts, we are empowered to critique the 
assumptions underlying current American policies; globally influential policies informed, 
it appears, by misinformed applications and delusional simplifications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
